After a recent debate, I realized something. In any conversation of "moral" action - one which includes the ability to make decisions - there needs to be a point where "should" and "should not" can be directly applied as far as potential for action. I'll include a sample conversation to further the idea -
A - "Do not talk about cooking as the action "talking about cooking" bothers me, and you are willingly doing so."
B - "My motivation towards "talking about cooking" is able to be influenced, it now has, and I will no longer do so, even though I like to talk about cooking - because if I maximize your satisfaction I will also naturally feel better in that you will likely care to maximize mine."
A - "On second thought, it also bothers me that you like to talk about cooking, whether or not you actually partake in it. My satisfaction will increase if you stop."
B - " I cannot stop as I do not decide my preferences."
A - "However, you can stop talking about it, though it wasn't a real "decision" to talk about it in the first place? What is the difference?"
In order to explain this discrepancy, let's single out the most conflicting factors.
In order of appearance: "spark" Interest | Desire | Action
-no motivation- -motivated by-
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Before I go any further with this idea, I want to clarify something essentially unrelated so that I do not forget.
Reality as we agree upon is built on a number of conditional statements. I'd like to take the idea "reality as we agree upon" and conform it to mean "reality". The knowledge of all that isn't can only be progressive in that it reveals what we agree "is". But, we have to agree, for my satisfaction hinges on the idea that others can utilize the information and apply it as well. In this way, my desires are flawed in that they are not solely independent (in which case I also have faith in my own ability to directly increase my own satisfaction more so than dependence.) Everything should be clear and concise. This is the route to agreement, and with the same information, we should all agree, dependent on the original conditional statements I referred to. It would be interesting to lay them out, but I won't, for some reasons. Just keep in mind that I would use quotes over every word if it didn't inhibit the impact of quotes over words that are especially context dependent. (also tiring)
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So, back to the idea from before the interruption. Basically, what I'm trying to clarify is that a preference, belief, or thought, is not in itself quenching a motivated desire to have itself. Because it is not desire based, there is no action presented that creates it, it is solely considered a reaction.
An action is what we'll consider something that is quenching a desire. There is a motivation.
